Last updated on May 31, 2010
Forthcoming articles
“Putnam and the Contextually A Priori,” in Lewis E. Hahn and Randall E. Auxier, eds., The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court) draft (pdf)
“Anti-Individualism, Self-Knowledge, and Epistemic Possibility: A Clarification and Defense of a Puzzle About Doubt,” in A. Hatzimoysis, ed., Self-Knowledge (Oxford University Press) draft (pdf)
“Davidson’s Explication of Meaning,” in Gerhard Preyer, ed., Davidson’s Philosophy: A Reappraisal (Oxford University Press) draft (pdf)
Selected Publications
Rule-Following and Realism |
Truth & Words |
“Why Skepticism About Self-Knowledge is Self-Undermining,” in Analysis, Volume 65, Number 3 (2005): 237-244 pdf
“Denotation and Discovery,” in Frederick F. Schmitt, ed., Socializing Metaphysics: the Nature of Social Reality (Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 247-268 pdf
“A Puzzle About Doubt,” in Susana Nuccetelli, ed., New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge (MIT, 2003), 143-168 pdf
“Learning from Others,” Noûs, Volume 36, Number 4 (2002): 525-549 pdf
“Truth and Trans-Theoretical Terms,” in James Conant and Urszula Zeglen, eds., Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism (London: Routledge, 2002), 167-185
“Is Skepticism about Self-Knowledge Coherent?” Philosophical Studies 105 (2001): 43-58
“Carnap’s Logical Syntax,” in Richard Gaskin, ed., Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2001), 218-237
“Vagueness, Sharp Boundaries, and Supervenience Conditions,” Synthese 127 (2001): 303-323
“The Very Idea of Sameness of Extension Across Time,” American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 37, Number 3 (2000): 245-268 pdf
“Bilgrami’s Theory of Belief and Meaning,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 58, Number 3 (1998): 613-620
“Can We Take Our Words at Face Value?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 56, Number 3 (1996): 499-530
“Realism and Rational Inquiry,” Philosophical Topics, Volume 20, Number 1 (1992): 1-33
“Skepticism, Objectivity, and Brains in Vats,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 73, Number 3 (1992): 239-266
Review of Pursuit of Truth, rev. ed., by W. V. Quine, The Philosophical Review, Volume 103, Number 3 (1994): 535-541
Works in Progress (available on request)
“Quine and Carnap on Truth by Convention”
"Can a Deflationist Make Sense of Kripke's Semantic Arguments Against Descriptivism?"
"Quine Gets the Last Word"
"Linguistic Competence, Meaning, and Rules"