About my research   

The central goal of my research is to describe the methodology of rational inquiry from an engaged, practical point of view. I propose new accounts of truth, logical truth, rule-following, semantic anti-individualism, and self-knowledge, as well as new interpretations of influential writings on these topics, including writings by Rudolf Carnap, W. V. Quine, Hilary Putnam, Donald Davidson, and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

 

Contact Information

Department of Philosophy
Indiana University
Sycamore Hall 026
1033 East Third Street
Bloomington, IN 47405-7005
U.S.A.

 

Gary Ebb's e-mail


 

 Last updated on May19, 2012

 

Forthcoming book

 

Debating Self-Knowledge, co-authored with Anthony Brueckner. (A collection of some of Tony's and my already-published papers, in which we debate a cluster of closely-linked questions about self-knowledge, anti-individualism, and skepticism, and three new essays, two by me and one by Tony.) Cambridge University Press, 2012. Link to CUP

 

Forthcoming articles

 

The Dialectical Context of Putnams Argument that We are Not Brains in Vats, in Gary Ebbs and Anthony Brueckner, Debating Self-Knowledge (Cambridge University Press, 2012)

Self-Knowledge in Doubt, in Gary Ebbs and Anthony Brueckner, Debating Self-Knowledge (Cambridge University Press, 2012)

“Putnam and the Contextually A Priori,” in Lewis E. Hahn and Randall E. Auxier, eds., The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court)  draft (pdf)

“Davidson’s Explication of Meaning,” in Gerhard Preyer, ed., Davidson’s Philosophy: A Reappraisal (Oxford University Press, 2012)

Mendolas Internalism, in Analytic Philosophy, as part of a symposium on Joe Mendola's book Anti-Externalism 

 

Publications

 

rule-following and realism

Rule-Following and Realism
   Harvard University Press, 1997
Paperback Edition, 2001
Link to HUP

truth and words

Truth & Words
  Oxford University Press, 2009
Paperback Edition, 2011

Link to OUP

 

Quine Gets the Last Word, The Journal of Philosophy, Volume 108, Issue 11, November 2011: 617-632

Carnap and Quine on Truth by Convention, in Mind, Volume 120, Issue 478, April 2011 html, pdf

“Anti-Individualism, Self-Knowledge, and Epistemic Possibility: A Clarification and Defense of a Puzzle About Doubt,” in A. Hatzimoysis, ed., Self-Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2011), 53-79  pdf

“Why Skepticism About Self-Knowledge is Self-Undermining,” in Analysis, Volume 65, Number 3 (2005): 237-244  pdf

“Denotation and Discovery,” in Frederick F. Schmitt, ed., Socializing Metaphysics: the Nature of Social Reality (Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 247-268  pdf

“A Puzzle About Doubt,” in Susana Nuccetelli, ed., New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge (MIT, 2003), 143-168  pdf

“Learning from Others,” Noûs, Volume 36, Number 4 (2002): 525-549  pdf

“Truth and Trans-Theoretical Terms,” in James Conant and Urszula Zeglen, eds., Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism (London: Routledge, 2002), 167-185

“Is Skepticism about Self-Knowledge Coherent?” Philosophical Studies 105 (2001): 43-58

“Carnap’s Logical Syntax,” in Richard Gaskin, ed., Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2001), 218-237

“Vagueness, Sharp Boundaries, and Supervenience Conditions,” Synthese 127 (2001): 303-323

“The Very Idea of Sameness of Extension Across Time,” American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 37, Number 3 (2000): 245-268   pdf

“Bilgrami’s Theory of Belief and Meaning,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 58, Number 3 (1998): 613-620

“Can We Take Our Words at Face Value?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 56, Number 3 (1996): 499-530

“Realism and Rational Inquiry,” Philosophical Topics, Volume 20, Number 1 (1992): 1-33

“Skepticism, Objectivity, and Brains in Vats,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 73, Number 3 (1992): 239-266

Review of Pursuit of Truth, rev. ed., by W. V. Quine, The Philosophical Review, Volume 103, Number 3 (1994): 535-541

 

Works in Progress

 

"Carnap and Quine," for Gilbert Harman and Ernest Lepore (eds.), A Companion to Quine (Blackwell)

"Logical Truth from a Quinean Point of View"

"Transparence and Entitlement at the Limits of Doubt"

"How to Think About Whether We Are Brains in Vats"

"Satisfying Predicates for First-Order Schemata: the Löwenheim-Hilbert-Bernays Theorem"

"The Philosophical Significance of the Löwenheim-Hilbert-Bernays Theorem"

"Can a Deflationist Make Sense of Kripke's Semantic Arguments Against Descriptivism?"