About my research   

The central goal of my research is to describe the methodology of rational inquiry from an engaged, practical point of view. I propose new accounts of truth, logical truth, rule-following, semantic anti-individualism, and self-knowledge, as well as new interpretations of influential writings on these topics, including writings by Rudolf Carnap, W. V. Quine, Hilary Putnam, Donald Davidson, and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

 

Contact Information

Department of Philosophy
Indiana University
Sycamore Hall 026
1033 East Third Street
Bloomington, IN 47405-7005
U.S.A.

 

Gary Ebb's e-mail


 

 Last updated on October 28, 2012

 

Forthcoming articles

 

“Putnam and the Contextually A Priori,” in Lewis E. Hahn and Randall E. Auxier, eds., The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court)  draft (pdf)

Mendolas Internalism, in Analytic Philosophy, as part of a symposium on Joe Mendola's book Anti-Externalism 

Quines Naturalistic Explication of Carnaps Logic of Science, in Gilbert Harman and Ernest Lepore (eds.), A Companion to Quine (Blackwell)

 

Publications

 

                    

Debating Self-Knowledge
 Co-authored with Anthony Brueckner
 
Cambridge University Press 2012

Link to CUP

 

 

 

 

                    

truth and words

Truth & Words
  Oxford University Press, 2009
  Paperback Edition, 2011

Link to OUP

 

 

rule-following and realism

  Rule-Following and Realism
   Harvard University Press, 1997
Paperback Edition, 2001
Link to HUP

 

 

“Davidson’s Explication of Meaning,” in Gerhard Preyer, ed., Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental (Oxford University Press, 2012), 76-104   Link to OUP

The Dialectical Context of Putnam's Argument that We are Not Brains in Vats,” in Ebbs and Brueckner, Debating Self-Knowledge (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 66-82

Self-Knowledge in Doubt, in Ebbs and Brueckner, Debating Self-Knowledge (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 186-216

Quine Gets the Last Word, The Journal of Philosophy, Volume 108, Issue 11, November 2011: 617-632

Carnap and Quine on Truth by Convention, in Mind, Volume 120, Issue 478, April 2011 html, pdf

“Anti-Individualism, Self-Knowledge, and Epistemic Possibility: A Clarification and Defense of a Puzzle About Doubt,” in A. Hatzimoysis, ed., Self-Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2011), 53-79  pdf

“Why Skepticism About Self-Knowledge is Self-Undermining,” in Analysis, Volume 65, Number 3 (2005): 237-244  pdf

“Denotation and Discovery,” in Frederick F. Schmitt, ed., Socializing Metaphysics: the Nature of Social Reality (Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 247-268  pdf

“A Puzzle About Doubt,” in Susana Nuccetelli, ed., New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge (MIT, 2003), 143-168  pdf

“Learning from Others,” Noûs, Volume 36, Number 4 (2002): 525-549  pdf

“Truth and Trans-Theoretical Terms,” in James Conant and Urszula Zeglen, eds., Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism (London: Routledge, 2002), 167-185

“Is Skepticism about Self-Knowledge Coherent?” Philosophical Studies 105 (2001): 43-58

“Carnap’s Logical Syntax,” in Richard Gaskin, ed., Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2001), 218-237

“Vagueness, Sharp Boundaries, and Supervenience Conditions,” Synthese 127 (2001): 303-323

“The Very Idea of Sameness of Extension Across Time,” American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 37, Number 3 (2000): 245-268   pdf

“Bilgrami’s Theory of Belief and Meaning,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 58, Number 3 (1998): 613-620

“Can We Take Our Words at Face Value?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 56, Number 3 (1996): 499-530

“Realism and Rational Inquiry,” Philosophical Topics, Volume 20, Number 1 (1992): 1-33

“Skepticism, Objectivity, and Brains in Vats,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 73, Number 3 (1992): 239-266

Review of Pursuit of Truth, rev. ed., by W. V. Quine, The Philosophical Review, Volume 103, Number 3 (1994): 535-541

 

Works in Progress

 

“Can Logical Truth be Characterized in Purely Exensional Terms?”

Goldfarb on Wittgenstein on Following a Rule

Epistemic Entitlement at the Limits of Doubt

How to Think About Whether We Are Brains in Vats

Satisfying Predicates for First-Order Schemata: the Löwenheim-Gödel-Hilbert-Bernays Theorem

Can a Deflationist Make Sense of Kripke's Semantic Arguments Against Descriptivism?