Last updated on October 28, 2012
Forthcoming articles
“Putnam and the Contextually A Priori,” in Lewis E. Hahn and Randall E. Auxier, eds., The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court) draft (pdf)
“Mendola’s Internalism,” in Analytic Philosophy, as part of a symposium on Joe Mendola's book Anti-Externalism
“Quine’s Naturalistic Explication of Carnap’s Logic of Science,” in Gilbert Harman and Ernest Lepore (eds.), A Companion to Quine (Blackwell)
Publications
Debating Self-Knowledge |
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Truth & Words
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Rule-Following and Realism |
“Davidson’s Explication of Meaning,” in Gerhard Preyer, ed., Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental (Oxford University Press, 2012), 76-104 Link to OUP
“The Dialectical Context of Putnam's Argument that We are Not Brains in Vats,” in Ebbs and Brueckner, Debating Self-Knowledge (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 66-82
“Self-Knowledge in Doubt,” in Ebbs and Brueckner, Debating Self-Knowledge (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 186-216
“Quine Gets the Last Word,” The Journal of Philosophy, Volume 108, Issue 11, November 2011: 617-632
“Carnap and Quine on Truth by Convention,” in Mind, Volume 120, Issue 478, April 2011 html, pdf
“Anti-Individualism, Self-Knowledge, and Epistemic Possibility: A Clarification and Defense of a Puzzle About Doubt,” in A. Hatzimoysis, ed., Self-Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2011), 53-79 pdf
“Why Skepticism About Self-Knowledge is Self-Undermining,” in Analysis, Volume 65, Number 3 (2005): 237-244 pdf
“Denotation and Discovery,” in Frederick F. Schmitt, ed., Socializing Metaphysics: the Nature of Social Reality (Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 247-268 pdf
“A Puzzle About Doubt,” in Susana Nuccetelli, ed., New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge (MIT, 2003), 143-168 pdf
“Learning from Others,” Noûs, Volume 36, Number 4 (2002): 525-549 pdf
“Truth and Trans-Theoretical Terms,” in James Conant and Urszula Zeglen, eds., Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism (London: Routledge, 2002), 167-185
“Is Skepticism about Self-Knowledge Coherent?” Philosophical Studies 105 (2001): 43-58
“Carnap’s Logical Syntax,” in Richard Gaskin, ed., Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2001), 218-237
“Vagueness, Sharp Boundaries, and Supervenience Conditions,” Synthese 127 (2001): 303-323
“The Very Idea of Sameness of Extension Across Time,” American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 37, Number 3 (2000): 245-268 pdf
“Bilgrami’s Theory of Belief and Meaning,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 58, Number 3 (1998): 613-620
“Can We Take Our Words at Face Value?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 56, Number 3 (1996): 499-530
“Realism and Rational Inquiry,” Philosophical Topics, Volume 20, Number 1 (1992): 1-33
“Skepticism, Objectivity, and Brains in Vats,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 73, Number 3 (1992): 239-266
Review of Pursuit of Truth, rev. ed., by W. V. Quine, The Philosophical Review, Volume 103, Number 3 (1994): 535-541
Works in Progress
“Can Logical Truth be Characterized in Purely Exensional Terms?”
“Goldfarb on Wittgenstein on Following a Rule”
“Epistemic Entitlement at the Limits of Doubt”
“How to Think About Whether We Are Brains in Vats”
“Satisfying Predicates for First-Order Schemata: the Löwenheim-Gödel-Hilbert-Bernays Theorem”
“Can a Deflationist Make Sense of Kripke's Semantic Arguments Against Descriptivism?”